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I. INTRODUCTION
Of the many theories underlying the Free Speech Clause, undoubtedly one
of the most readily accepted theories is that the Framers believed that unbridled
discussion of the issues of the day was essential for self-governance1 and that, at
* The authors are founding members of the law firm Hall & Bowers, LLC, in Columbia,
South Carolina. They represented the plaintiff in Page v. Lexington County School District One,
531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008), which is discussed throughout this Article.
1. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) ("Speech is an essential
mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.").
1
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bottom, the "marketplace of ideas" would separate the wheat from the chaff.
2
This understanding of the Free Speech Clause, given life through the well-
established forum analysis, strives to place only narrow, limited restraints on
private speakers.3 Even in those forums where heightened speech restrictions are
permitted, the Supreme Court has been clear that the government cannot regulate
speech based only on the views a speaker wishes to express.4 As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit puts it: "The ban on viewpoint
discrimination is a constant.",
5
In recent years, courts have started writing a different set of analytical rules
to apply when the government itself attempts to join the debate. Instead of
treating the government as just another speaker in a forum, courts have struggled
to craft guidelines outside of the traditional forum analysis for allowing
governments to speak.6 Given the government-speech doctrine's unsettled state,
courts often qualify discussions of it with a notation that the law in this area is7
still developing. It is somewhat surprising, though, that courts frequently fail to
account for the First Amendment's fundamental guarantees of free speech to
private speakers when discussing the nuances of this fledgling doctrine. Instead,
2. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The
marketplace of ideas theory stems from Justice Holmes's opinion inAbrams v. United States:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Id.
3. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (permitting municipalities to enact
regulations to protect the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens so long as they do not abridge
First Amendment liberties).
4. See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (2009) ("Restrictions on
speech based on its content are 'presumptively invalid' and subject to strict scrutiny." (quoting
Davenport v Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 188 (2007))); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)) (permitting a state to enact time, place, and manner
restrictions so long as the regulations are not aimed at suppressing the speaker's views).
5. Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062, 1067
(4th Cir. 2006).
6. See, e.g., Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001)
(citing Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093-94 (8th
Cir. 2000)) (using a four-factor test announced by the Eighth Circuit); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch.
Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the rules used for private speech and focusing
instead on "who actually was responsible for the speech").
7. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles (SCV 1), 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]here exists some controversy over the
scope of the government speech doctrine."); Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port
Auth., No. 2:06-cv-1064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63370, at *21 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2008) ("The
government speech doctrine is still in the formative stages."); Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v.
Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1357 (M.D. Ala. 2003) ("[T]he scope and extent of the doctrine are
unsettled questions at the present time.").
[VOL. 61: 549
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courts have tended to interpret this new strain of First Amendment law in such a
way so as to give the government an open microphone without giving dissenters
a chance to air their viewponts. The Fourth Circuit initially resisted this
temptation, 8 but at least one recent decision from that court greatly deferred to
the government at the expense of private dissenting viewpoints when the
governement wished to participate in a discussion about pending legislation.9
This Article surveys and critiques the Fourth Circuit's government-speech
decisions, paying particular attention to how the court has sometimes struggled
to find a place for both government speech and private speech in the marketplace
of ideas. This Article is not meant to serve as a comprehensive study of the
government-speech doctrine, but it is designed to provide the reader with a
thumbnail guide to the Fourth Circuit's treatment of key issues that have arisen
during the evolution of this thread of jurisprudence. As discussed below, the
court has issued conflicting decisions and has frequently altered course on how it
analyzes important-often dispositive-questions associated with the
government-speech doctrine. Because multiple government-speech cases within
the Fourth Circuit have received considerable attention with respect to the
potential for en banc consideration, a rich series of exchanges among the judges
colors the court's jurisprudence on the doctrine's fundamental points.
The next part of this Article provides an overview of the government-speech
doctrine, including a discussion of problems commentators have identified with
the doctrine. Part III then examines the Fourth Circuit's decisions with respect to
three key, often interrelated questions that arise in the government-speech
context: (1) whether the traditional forum analysis has any applicability when
government speech is present; (2) how to determine when the government is
speaking; and (3) under what circumstances the government can convert private
speech into its own speech. This Article concludes that, because of the strong,
divergent views that the circuit's members have espoused through the battery of
case law, many answers to the scope and application of the govermnent-speech
doctrine will require further guidance from the Supreme Court.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE
As noted above, courts have traditionally applied the established forum
analysis to government restrictions on private speech that occurs on public
property. 0 For First Amendment purposes, government property can be
8. See, e.g., Griffin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 274 F.3d 818, 821 (4th Cir. 2001)
(blending the traditional forum analysis and the government-speech doctrine).
9. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding
that a school district's communications constituted government speech, thus permitting the school
district to communicate via its Web site and email in opposition to pending state legislation while at
the same time excluding those in support of the legislation from communicating through the same
channels).
10. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
3
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classified as a public forum, a designated public forum, a nonpublic forum, or no
forum at all.1 Although courts apply different levels of scrutiny to speech
restrictions in each of these types of fora-a public forum is subject to strict
scrutiny, while a nonpublic forum calls for a more relaxed standard-
government regulation based only on a speaker's viewpoint is unconstitutional
irrespective of the forum's label. 12The prohibition on government discrimination
among J~rivate speakers based on their views is a staple of the Free Speech
Clause. As the Supreme Court often reminds, the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality ensures that the marketplace of ideas remains as competitive as
possible. 14 But despite the fact that forum analysis is suited to account for all
speech that occurs on public property, courts have largely carved the
government's own speech out of the forum analysis framework through the
development of the government-speech doctrine.
The government-speech doctrine is grounded on the belief that the
government, like any private speaker, can "speak for itself. '15 For a
communication to qualify as government speech, the government must be
responsible for the message disseminated. 16 And when the government itself is
speaking, its speech is largely free from scrutiny under the First Amendment,
including the viewpoint-neutrality requirement.
17
While the Free Speech Clause does not explicitly limit what the government
may say, courts have recognized some restrictions on government speech. The
11. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998) (discussing
the various designations of government property under the traditional forum analysis). As the
Supreme Court frequently recognizes, the property that the private speaker attempts to access does
not need to be a physical location for forum analysis to apply. Regulations on access to charity
drives, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985), a student
activities find, Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995), and a school
district's internal mail distribution system, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983), have all been subjects of forum analysis.
12. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-78 (explaining that the State may "restrict access to a
nonpublic forum 'as long as the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view"' (alteration in original)
(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800)); SCVI, 288 F.3d at 616 n.4 ("[V]iewpoint-based restrictions
of private speech are presumptively unconstitutional." (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382 (1992))).
13. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
14. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (explaining that the
First Amendment is designed to foster "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail" (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting))).
15. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
16. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (concluding that an
advertising campaign constituted government speech because "the government set[] the overall
message to be communicated and approve[d] every word that [was] disseminated").
17. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) ("The Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.").
[VOL. 61: 549
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss3/7
2010] FOURTH CIRCUIT GOVERNMENT-SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE 553
Establishment Clause, for instance, limits government speech that has a religious
flavor.18 Moreover, some argue that these restrictions on religious-based speech
should be applied to government speech dealing with political matters. 19 In this
regard, several courts have interpreted local laws to bar government advocacy
regarding political matters unless the State also affords equal time to dissenting
20viewpoints .
Notwithstanding these limitations, courts typically point to the ballot box as
the principal check on government speech.21 Reliance on the electorate, rather
than the judiciary, as the chief arbiter of government speech presumes both that
the electorate is able to recognize when the government is speaking and that it is
able to attribute favorable or objectionable speech to the public entity.22 As a
18. See id. at 1132 ("[G]overnment speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.").
19. See Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment
Clause, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1104, 1104 (1979) ("[T]he courts should read the first amendment to
contain an implied prohibition against political establishment."). Even courts that have permitted a
public body to implore the citizenry to adopt a certain political position recognize that such
advocacy "can undermine [the government's] legitimacy as a champion of the people's will and
thereby subvert one of the principles underlying democratic society." Kidwell v. City of Union, 462
F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2006). Judge Martin, dissenting in Kidwell, took the majority's observation
a step further and suggested that the government runs afoul of the Guarantee Clause's assurance of a
republican form of government when it engages in political advocacy. See id. at 635 n.5 (Martin, J.,
dissenting). Likewise, several Supreme Court Justices wrote separately in Pleasant Grove City to
indicate that the government-speech doctrine would not defend political advocacy by a public
entity. See Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that the
government's decision to display a permanent monument on public grounds is acceptable when
such a display does not communicate an "offensive or partisan message[]"); id. at 1140 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("Were the City to discriminate in the selection of permanent monuments on grounds
unrelated to the display's theme, say solely on political grounds, its action might well violate the
First Amendment."); see also Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose (Rose I1), 373 F.3d 580, 581
(4th Cir. 2004) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that it is improper
for "the state to privilege private speech on one side-and one side only-of a fundamental moral,
religious, or political controversy").
20. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 459 F. Supp. 357,
360-61 (D. Colo. 1978) (ruling that a school district's devotion of public resources to only one side
of a partisan issue violates the First Amendment); Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1976)
(arguing that the government cannot "bestow an unfair advantage on one of several competing
factions"); Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So. 2d 529, 541 (Miss. 1992) ("For it is only when public coffers
are used to advocate only one side, with no opportunity for dissenters to present their side of the
issue, when school boards overstep lawful authority and any implied power. In a nutshell, the school
board can inform, but not persuade." (citing Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Bd. of Educ., 98 A.2d
673, 678 (N.J. 1953))); Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds, 98 A.2d at 678 ("It is the expenditure of
public funds in support of one side only in a manner which gives the dissenters no opportunity to
present their side which is outside the pale.").
21. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000) ("If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or
contrary position.").
22. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 571-72 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that if the government intends to rely on the government-speech doctrine as a
defense, "it must make itself politically accountable by indicating that the content actually is a
5
Carroll and Hall: A Survey of the Fourth Circuit's Developing Government-Speech Jur
Published by Scholar Commons, 2010
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
result, the government-speech analysis often looks to whether the government,
not a private citizen, delivers a message in such a way that the government is
politically accountable for the communication. 23 By forcing the public entity to
take unmistakable responsibility for a message, these analytical prongs are
designed to cure the situation "in which it is difficult to tell whether a
government entit is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for
private speech.
' 2
While most courts have dismissed challenges to government speech by
directing the aggrieved party to voice its concern during the next election,
some have been skeptical of the doctrine's blind reliance on the ballot box as a
26true safeguard in all situations. When the government uses public resources to
promote a political outcome-such as for a candidate on the ballot or a vote on a
bill pending before the legislature-the State risks irreparably distorting the
speech market. This manufactured, rather than organic, consent could be the
result of the citizenry's natural trust of an authority 27 or of the asymmetry of
resources available to a dissenting private speaker vis-A-vis the State.28 As
government message" and explaining that such accountability requires the public entity to
"explicitly label[] the speech as its own").
23. See, e.g., Turner v. City Council, 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008) ("In order to
determine whether the speech in question is government or private speech, we consider... 'whether
the government or the private entity bears the "ultimate responsibility" for the content of the
speech."' (quoting SCVI, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002))).
24. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. Numerous commentators have pointed out problems that government speech can create
with respect to the legitimacy of the regulating authority. See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's
Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MiCH. J.L. REFORM 35, 42 (2002)
("[W]here the government skews the private speech market, it skews the basis of the consent that
renders it legitimate."); Brian C. Castello, Note, The Voice of Government as an Abridgement of
First Amendment Rights of Speakers: Rethinking Meese v. Keene, 1989 DUKE L.J. 654, 676-81
(cataloging the "Undesirable Effects of Government Communication," including government
coercion of consent, suppression of minority viewpoints, and an asymmetry of "bargaining power"
in the "ideological marketplace"); The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L.
REv. 169, 285 (2005) (warning that unrestricted government speech "seems to present the
significant risk of a 'falsified majority,' a self-perpetuating feedback loop in which a majority is
maintained not by virtue of the idea uniting it, but through continual reinforcement" (quoting
Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 373, 378 (1983))). These
observations have been shared by some on the bench. See, e.g., Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d
620, 635 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting) ("[T]he idea that governmental funds could be spent
in an effort to perpetuate a government in office is no doubt antithetical to the values underlying the
Constitution."); Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 482 (1st
Cir. 1989) ("There is no question that unfettered government speech can be dangerous to our
democratic society."). In his Kidwell dissent, Judge Martin argued that unless the government
creates a forum for the expression of all viewpoints, it risks crossing "the line of demarcation
between informing and advocacy." 462 F.3d at 636-37 (Martin, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Stem v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) ("[P]restige
and influence naturally aris[e] from any endorsement of a governmental authority.").
28. See, e.g., Palm Beach County v. Hudspeth, 540 So. 2d 147, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
("If government, with its relatively vast financial resources, access to the media and technical know-
[VOL. 61: 549
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President Yudof summed when warning about dangers inherent in government
advocacy, "[e]xpression by government is critical to democratic processes, but
the power of governments to communicate is also the power to destroy the
underpinnings of government by consent. The power to teach, inform, and lead
is also the power to indoctrinate, distort judgment, and perpetuate the current
regime. '29 These concerns have resulted in calls for courts to develop the
government-speech doctrine deliberately and narrowly to ensure that government
entities do not use the defense to mask otherwise impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.30
The Fourth Circuit has long been considered to be on the forefront of
government-speech jurisprudence. Beginning with a decision in 2001,31 the court
has had several opportunities to refine the analysis in such a way to account for
the concerns noted above-preserving the sanctity of the ballot box, preventing
the use of public dollars to distort the speech market, and preventing the
government from hiding discriminatory conduct by claiming that it is merely
expressing its own position on a topic. The Fourth Circuit's rulings in this area,
however, have sometimes made the government-speech analysis more opaque
and have failed to address with certainty key questions that arise in this context.
The next part analyzes these decisions.
how, undertakes a campaign to favor or oppose a measure placed on the ballot, then by so doing
government undercuts the very fabric which the constitution weaves to prevent government from
stifling the voice of the people.").
29. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GovERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 42 (1983). President Yudofs observation recalls Justice Jackson's
famous observation in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
Id. at 642.
30. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("Because the government speech doctrine... is 'recently minted,' it would do well for
us to go slow in setting its bounds, which will affect existing doctrine in ways not yet explored."
(citation omitted)); Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for a narrow application of the government-
speech doctrine because "[i]t is nearly impossible to concoct examples of viewpoint discrimination
on government channels that cannot otherwise be repackaged ex post as 'government speech');
The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 26, at 278 (citing Johanns v. Livestock
Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)) (critiquing Johanns and warning that if the government-speech
doctrine "is not carefully limited, it may pose a grave threat to the First Amendment's ability to
guard against government distortions of the speech market").
31. Griffin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 274 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2001).
7
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III. TIlE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH
DOCTRINE
The government-speech doctrine, while still early in its development, has
received considerable attention in the Fourth Circuit. Since 2001, at least six
different cases have given the court an opportunity to address the doctrine
against a variety of factual backgrounds.32 The respective outcomes of these
cases have largely hinged on whether the court found that the government itself
was speaking, although several of these decisions demonstrate the considerable
disagreement among the circuit's judges as to how to determine when speech is
the government's own speech.33 The disparity in these decisions-as well as
various other opinions from circuit judges in concurrence, in dissent, and with
respect to en banc petitions-shows that some subtleties (as well as some
fundamentals) of the government-speech doctrine are far from settled.34 This part
addresses the Fourth Circuit's decisions with respect to three issues that are at
the core of the government-speech doctrine: (1) whether forum analysis has any
applicability when government speech is present; (2) how the court determines
when the government is speaking; and (3) under what circumstances the
government can convert third-party speech into its own.
32. See WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 294
(4th Cir. 2009) (challenging on First Amendment grounds "West Virginia's restrictions on limited
video lottery advertising"); Turner v. City Council, 534 F.3d 352, 353 (4th Cir. 2008) (challenging
on First Amendment grounds a policy that required that legislative prayers to be
nondenominational); Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 277-78 (4th Cir.
2008) (challenging denial of access to school district's modes of communication regarding proposed
tax legislation as a violation of First Amendment rights); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose
(Rose 1), 361 F.3d 786, 787-88 (4th Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., writing separately) (challenging on
First Amendment grounds the denial of pro-choice specialty license plates when state authorizes
"Choose Life" license plates); SCV1, 288 F.3d 610, 613-14 (4th Cir. 2002) (challenging denial of
license plate design as a First Amendment violation); Griffin, 274 F.3d at 819 (challenging
prohibition of flying Confederate flag in Confederate cemetery as a denial of First Amendment
right).
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. The Supreme Court has also struggled to craft a government-speech analysis on which all
of the Justices can agree. The Johanns decision, for instance, drew two dissenting opinions and a
concurrence that rejected the government-speech doctrine as a basis for the judgment. 544 U.S. at
569 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 570-80 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, although none of the Justices dissented from the Pleasant Grove City
judgment, several wrote separate opinions with respect to the doctrine. Justice Stevens-joined by
Justice Ginsburg-criticized the "recently minted government speech doctrine" as being "of
doubtful merit." 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Breyer's concurrence focused
on the caveat that "the 'government speech' doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid category." Id. at
1140 (Breyer, J., concurring). And now-retired Justice Souter, concurring only in the judgment,
suggested that the current test for government speech should be replaced by a "reasonable observer
test." Id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
[VOL. 61: 549
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A. What Role Does Forum Analysis Play with Respect to the Government-
Speech Doctrine?
As the discussion in Part II indicates, courts tend to treat forum analysis and
the government-speech doctrine as incompatible. But this does not have to be so.
In fact, in its first decision involving the government-speech doctrine, Griffin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, the Fourth Circuit blended the two
frameworks to account for private speech when the government is also speaking
36within a forum. In that case, the court viewed government speech through the
forum-analysis lens and concluded that government regulation of a forum in
which the government is also a participant must be viewpoint neutral.37
In Griffin, a private citizen sought to fly a Confederate flag daily in the Point
Lookout Confederate Cemetery, which is maintained by the Veterans
Administration, but a regulation required approval from the agency prior to the
private "display of any placards, banners, or foreign flags." 38 When the agency
denied Griffin's request, he challenged the regulation on its face and also
claimed to have been the subject of viewpoint discrimination.39 The Fourth
Circuit, merging government-speech principles into the familiar forum analysis,
rejected Griffin's claims.40
The court's analysis began by labeling the national cemetery a nonpublic
forum in which speech restrictions "must be both reasonable in light of the
purpose of the forum and viewpoint neutral., 41 In applying this traditional test, it
explained that the straightforward purpose of the national cemetery, as
prescribed by Congress, was to honor fallen American soldiers.42 From there, the
Griffin court examined the agency's regulations-which vested the Veterans
Administration with the sole discretion to establish what displays were permitted
in the cemetery-as government speech and explained that, in order to pass
constitutional muster, they must be reasonable in light of this legislative purpose
as well as viewpoint neutral.43
In the court's view, the agency's regulations were reasonable for two
reasons. First, the regulations already allowed for the Confederate flag to be
35. 274 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2001).
36. See id. at 820-25.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 819-20 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(14)(ii) (2001)).
39. Id. at 820.
40. See id. at 820-25.
41. Id. at 820.
42. Id. at 821-22 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 2403(c) (2000)).
43. Id. at 822-25. In reaching this analytical prong, the court recited several broad
propositions that are distinctly associated with the government-speech doctrine, including the basic
idea that the government is allowed to express a particular viewpoint. See id. at 822 ("The
government is entitled to promote particular messages and to 'take legitimate and appropriate steps
to ensure that its message[s] [are] neither garbled nor distorted."' (alterations in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))).
9
Carroll and Hall: A Survey of the Fourth Circuit's Developing Government-Speech Jur
Published by Scholar Commons, 2010
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
flown at the cemetery two days each year.44 Second, the agency "could
reasonably believe that the Confederate flag could cause controversy and that
such controversy could undermine the VA's goal of keeping the cemeteries free
from partisan conflict."45 Additionally, the regulations did not discriminate based
on viewpoint because the agency did not treat requests to fly the Confederate
flag differently from requests to display any other flag or banner in the
cemetery. 46  Because the challenged regulations-that is, the Veterans
Administration's speech-were reasonable, consistent with the cemetery's
purpose, and viewpoint neutral, the court rejected Griffin's First Amendment
claim.
47
The decision in Griffin is the only instance in the Fourth Circuit where the
court directly considered government speech within the confines of the
traditional forum analysis. But it is not the only occasion where some within the
circuit have expressed a belief that the same guidelines established for speech
restrictions in a forum must limit government speech. For instance, one judge
dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc of a later government-speech
decision:
I must note that I do not necessarily agree with the panel's
implication.., that the government can always engage in viewpoint
discrimination when it is the speaker. It may be that "the values
underlying viewpoint neutrality should in some circumstances limit the
government's ability to skew the debate and suppress disfavored ideas
or information."
48
As another judge explained in the context of legislation authorizing a pro-
life specialty license plate, the government-speech doctrine should not be twisted
in such a way that allows the State to enter a forum "as a covert but dominant
speaker, advocating for one viewpoint in the abortion debate without political
accountability and without authorizing the expression of the opposing
viewpoint.
4
44. Id. at 823.
45. Id. (emphasis omitted).
46. Id. at 824-25.
47. See id. at 822-24 (examining the reasonableness of the government's speech and
concluding that "the VA's restrictions are reasonable in light of the nature of this particular forum, a
cemetery dedicated to honoring, as Americans, the Nation's war dead"); id. at 825 ("The VA's
restrictions are not only reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum, but also viewpoint
neutral.").
48. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles (SCV
I/), 305 F.3d 241, 251 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
bane) (quoting Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 159
(1996)).
49. Rose I, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., writing separately).
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More recent decisions, however, have suggested that a finding of
government speech ends the analysis and that the presence of government speech
exempts the State from First Amendment scrutiny.50 The Supreme Court has
indicated that this latter framework is the proper one,51 though several justices
have noted disagreement with this position.
Though Griffin appears to have been trumped by later rulings, there is still
much merit in its approach to addressing government speech. Requiring speech
by a public entity to be reasonably related to the purposes of a forum places an
easily applied check on unbridled, and possibly abusive, government behavior.
Likewise, the universal requirement of viewpoint neutrality serves as a barrier to
the government monopolizing the speech market on a particular topic. 53 To be
50. See, e.g., Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 280 (4th Cir. 2008)
(stating that the school district's "success in this case" hinged only on whether the challenged
conduct amounted to government speech, not whether the challenged conduct satisfied review under
a forum analysis); Rose II, 373 F.3d 580, 584 (4th Cir. 2004) (Shedd, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc) ("If, on the other hand, the 'Choose Life' message is properly labeled
government speech, then the ordinary prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is inapplicable
and the statute survives First Amendment scrutiny.").
51. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) ("If [the State was]
engaging in [its] own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free
Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.").
52. See supra note 19 (outlining the positions taken in the various concurrences filed in
Pleasant Grove City).
53. An illustrative case that considers the government to be just another speaker in a forum-
and thus subject to the requirements of forum analysis-is Bonner-Lyons v. School Committee, 480
F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973). There, a school board passed a resolution opposing state legislation that
allowed forced busing for purposes of racially integrating the schools. Id. at 442-43 (citing MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 71, §§ 37C-37D (West 1969)). In furtherance of the board's resolution, it
distributed notices to parents via the school system's "internal distribution system," informing them
of the board's opposition to the integrating legislation and encouraging them to attend antibusing
rallies and "to write the Governor, the Senators and the Representatives in support of [a competing
bill pending before the legislature] which opposes busing without the written consent of the
parents." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Bonner-Lyons plaintiffs requested access to
the same distribution system for purposes of distributing probusing notices, but the school board
refused. Id. at 442. The First Circuit found the board's denial of equal access improper, even though
the board was communicating its own message:
[T]his message tended to lend support and to mobilize opinion in favor of the position of
those private parties who sponsored [the antibusing marches]. Under these circumstances,
we conclude that [the school board], by authorizing this distribution, sanctioned the use
of the school distribution system as a forum for discussion of at least those issues which
were treated in this notice.
Id. at 443. Even President Yudof, who does not advocate for much judicial regulation of
government speech, agrees that the Bonner-Lyons decision was correctly decided in light of the
partisan nature of the communication disseminated by the school board. See YUDOF, supra note 29,
at 299 (arguing that the plaintiff in Bonner-Lyons was rightly awarded a right of reply to
government speech because the school board had used its "position of public trust" to convey a
partisan message to a captive audience).
Bonner Lyons, of course, predates the Supreme Court's key government-speech opinions, so it
is given little weight by current courts. But the First Circuit's reasoning in that case is faithful to
11
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sure, the Supreme Court has previously ignored distinctions between private
speech and government speech when discussing the dangers posed by having
one speaker comer the marketplace of ideas.54 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
has been reasonably clear that when the government is a speaker, forum analysis
has little applicability.
55
Although forum analysis appears to be inapplicable in the face of
government speech, the Fourth Circuit has held that forum analysis is applicable
when the challenged speech is anything short of pure government speech. On
several occasions, such as in the context of vanity license plates and advertising
regulations associated with a state-operated lottery program, the Fourth Circuit
has found the relevant speech to be "hybrid" speech-that is, it contains
56elements of both private speech and government speech. In at least one
instance, the court concluded that forum analysis applies to the challenged
regulation despite the fact that the speech was at least partially attributable to the57,
government. Without First Amendment scrutiny of hybrid speech, the thinking
goes, the government could engage in "cloaked advocacy that allows the State to
promote an idea without being accountable to the political process. '8 Judge
both the First Amendment's prohibition on viewpoint discrimination and the notion that the
government must be able to inform the citizenry of its programs in order to govern effectively. The
limited holding of the case, therefore, is that when the government wishes to debate a partisan issue,
it cannot monopolize the forum but instead must allow dissenting viewpoints to be aired. Although
this approach could lead to logistical problems in accommodating other viewpoints (should the
government be required to designate equal space in a newsletter to all competing views? only the
primary dissenting view? to all potential speakers? a representative sample of speakers?), Bonner-
Lyons and Griffin seem to provide a better solution than the alternative approach that simply
silences disfavored views. If the government wishes to avoid a logistical headache, though, it can
simply stay out of the discussion and divert public resources to other tasks.
54. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or aprivate licensee." (emphasis added) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
55. See infra Part III.B.
56. See, e.g., WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292,
298 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an advertising restriction associated with a state lottery
program "does not fit neatly into either category: it is hybrid speech"); Rose I, 361 F.3d 786, 794
(4th Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., writing separately) (finding that a message on a specialty license plate
"appears to be neither purely government speech nor purely private speech, but a mixture of the
two"); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the speech at issue was
hybrid speech); id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing belief that speech at
issue has elements of both private speech and government speech).
57. See, e.g., Rose I, 361 F.3d at 794-95 (Michael, J., writing separately) (considering
"whether the State has engaged in viewpoint discrimination" and recognizing that the State has
provided "access to the license plate forum only to those who share its viewpoint"); id. at 801
(Gregory, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing his belief that the speech was hybrid speech
and noting that "the judgment reached.., applies the factors set forth in [SCVI]").
58. Id. at 795-96 (Michael, J., writing separately).
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Michael explained that hybrid speech does not enjoy the same exemption from
forum analysis as pure government speech:
When a certain viewpoint dominates a speech forum, it should be clear
to the public whether that dominance reflects the prevailing view or
whether it results from a government restriction. In this case, the pro-life
position exclusively dominates the abortion debate in the license plate
forum, but the reason for that dominance is not readily apparent to the
ordinary citizen. Those who see the Choose Life plate displayed on
vehicles, and fail to see a comparable pro-choice plate, are likely to
assume that the presence of one plate and the absence of another are the
result of popular choice.... The State can thereby mislead the public
into thinking that it has already won support for the position it is
promoting. This possibility thwarts "the rationale behind the
government's authority to draw otherwise impermissible viewpoint
distinctions in the government speech context," namely, "the
accountability inherent in the political process. 59
For plaintiffs seeking access to a forum, it is critical to be able to distinguish
a challenged speech restriction from pure government speech. In the Fourth
Circuit, showing that speech includes private elements is typically sufficient to
avoid the dispositive government-speech defense and allows the analysis to
proceed to a review of the forum and the legitimacy of a speech restriction. The
next subpart addresses the often difficult question of how to determine when the
government alone is speaking.
B. How Does the Fourth Circuit Determine When the Government Is
Speaking?
Because the Fourth Circuit largely sets aside the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality when the government is the sole speaker, it is critical that courts have
clear guidelines for discerning when the government is speaking. This crucial
inquiry, however, has created significant inconsistencies within the case law. A
case-by-case review of this issue, which has been the subject of a robust dialogue
among the circuit's judges, is illuminating.
1. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles and Planned Parenthood of South
Carolina Inc. v. Rose: The Four-Factor Test
The Fourth Circuit's lead opinion on the subject of distinguishing
government speech from private speech is Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
59. Id. at 798 (quoting SCVI, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)).
13
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Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (SCV 1),60 a
decision dealing with vanity license plates.61 In SCVI, the court-drawing on
out-of-circuit cases that had considered issues related to government speech-
presented four factors for consideration that were neither exhaustive nor always
62applicable. These factors included the following:
(1) the central "purpose" of the program in which the speech in question
occurs; (2) the degree of "editorial control" exercised by the government
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the
"literal speaker"; and (4) whether the government or the private entity
bears the "ultimate responsibility" for the content of the speech .... 63
The aims of this four-factor test are clear and consistent with the underlying
theories of the government-speech doctrine: speech should be attributed to the
government only when the government creates the message and assumes
accountability for the communication.
After examining these factors, the SCV I court concluded that the inclusion
of the Confederate flag on a specialty license plate at the request of the Sons of
Confederate Veterans was private speech rather than the speech of the Virginia
highway department. 64 This application of the four-factor test was not without
criticism, however, and the Fourth Circuit-on its own initiative, rather than at
the request of any party to the litigation-took an internal poll as to whether the
65ruling should be reconsidered en banc. The unusual proposition for a sua
sponte en banc rehearing failed by a slim six-to-five vote, but it did produce five
additional opinions with respect to the SCVI decision, three of which disagreed
with the panel's reasoning.
Judge Luttig agreed with the panel's result but presented a forceful argument
that the specialty license plates contain elements of both government and private
speech and should, therefore, be considered a hybrid of the two.6 7 Judge
Niemeyer and Judge Gregory, on the other hand, challenged the panel's
conclusion that the Sons of Confederate Veterans specialty plate represented the
60. 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002).
61. Id. at 613.
62. See id. at 618-19 (citing Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2001); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000); Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093-94 (8th Cir. 2000)) (relying on
decisions from the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits when crafting the four-factor test).
63. Id. at 618.
64. Id. at 621. This conclusion of private speech rather than government speech resulted in a
holding that the state agency's refusal to place the logo on the Sons of Confederate Veterans'
specialty plate was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 626.
65. SCVII, 305 F.3d 241, 242 (4th Cir. 2002).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 245 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en bane) ("[S]peech that
appears on the so-called 'special' or 'vanity' license plate could prove to be the quintessential
example of speech that is both private and governmental .... ").
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68organization's own speech. In Judge Niemeyer's view, any speech that appears
on a license plate must be considered government speech because the State
"owns the license plates it issues and rightfully controls what appears on
them."69 Judge Gregory's critique expressly focused on the panel's four-factor
test, which he considered to be "incomplete at best" and "not ... sufficiently
nuanced" to address specialty license plates.70 No doubt, the most pointed
exchange among the judges was Judge Luttig's dismissal of Judge Niemeyer's
analysis for identifying government speech:
No one, upon careful consideration, would contend that, simply
because the government owns and controls the forum, all speech that
takes place in that forum is necessarily and exclusively government
speech. Such would mean that even speech by private individuals in
traditional public fora is government speech, which is obviously not the
71case.
Despite the narrow en banc vote and the internal criticism of the test
announced in SCVI, the Fourth Circuit continued to measure speech against
72these four factors in its next government-speech ruling. Again, though, the
court's judges disagreed with the test's application. In Planned Parenthood of
South Carolina Inc. v. Rose (Rose 1),73 a three-judge panel-Judges Michael,
Luttig, and Gregory-agreed that a "Choose Life" specialty license plate that
originated with the South Carolina General Assembly, rather than with a private
organization, amounted to a mixture of private and government speech. The
panelists, however, each wrote separately to explain their reasoning.
Judge Michael, whose opinion was by far the longest and most detailed,
examined each of SCVIs four factors and concluded that two-the "purpose"
and "editorial control" prongs-suggested that the specialty plate was
government speech but that the remaining two-the "literal speaker" and
68. See id. at 249 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane); id. at 252
(Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
69. Id. at 249 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane). Not
surprisingly, Judge Niemeyer's analysis was expressly rejected by Judge Williams, see id. at 243
(Williams, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc), who wrote the panel's opinion in SCV
1, 288 F.3d at 613.
70. SCVII, 305 F.3d at 251-52 (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane).
71. Id. at 246 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
72. See Rose I, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., writing separately) ("I begin
by applying the SCV test to determine whether the speech at issue can be characterized as either
government or private speech."); id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Accordingly,
because I believe the judgment reached today applies the factors set forth in [SCV I] in a manner
that begins to recognize the government speech interests that are implicated in the vanity license
plate forum, I concur in the judgment.").
73. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
74. See id. at 787, 794 (Michael, J., writing separately); id. at 800-01 (Luttig, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in the judgment).
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"ultimate responsibility" prongs-weighed in favor of a private-speech finding.75
In Judge Michael's view, the fact that the Choose Life message resulted from a
statute meant both that the message's purpose was to convey the State's position
on the issue of abortion and that the legislature maintained complete editorial
76control over the message. But the fact that drivers were allowed to choose
whether they would display the Choose Life message on their vehicles rendered
the drivers the actual speakers of the message and vested the drivers with
ultimate responsibility for the antiabortion sentiment.77 This mixture of
government speech and private speech prompted Judge Michael to conclude that
South Carolina's Choose Life specialty license plate was hybrid speech.78 The
remaining panelists agreed with this conclusion, though Judge Luttig's analysis
was entirely independent of SCVIs four-factor test79 and Judge Gregory's
analysis grudgingly accepted that test because it was circuit precedent.
80
Like its immediate predecessor, Rose I generated a poll regarding a
rehearing en banc.81 And just as in SCV II two years earlier, the Fourth Circuit
narrowly declined to reconsider the Rose I panel's ruling en banc, but several
judges generated additional opinions with respect to the en banc decision. 82 This
time, it was Judge Shedd-joined by Judge Williams, the author of SCVI-who
took issue with the panel's application of the four-factor test. His analysis
diverged from Judge Michael's analysis with respect to the literal speaker and
83ultimate responsibility prongs. Judge Shedd argued:
By giving interested citizens the option to endorse its message [by
displaying a statutorily created specialty license plate], the State has not
lost its place as the literal speaker of that message. The proper question
is whether the private citizen "engages the government to publish his
message" or the government "engages the private citizen to publish its
message.". . . The vehicle owner's purchasing the specialty plate
signifies his endorsement of the State's message, not his engaging the
State to speak his own message.
84
Because the message resulted from a statute, the legislature bore the ultimate
responsibility for the speech:
75. Id. at 793-94 (Michael, J., writing separately).
76. Id. at 793.
77. Id. at 794.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 800-01 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment).
80. See id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in the judgment).
81. Rose ll, 373 F.3d 580, 581 (4th Cir. 2004).
82. Id. at 581.
83. See id. at 586-87 (Shedd, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane).
84. Id. at 586 (quoting SCVII, 305 F.3d at 246 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing
en banc)).
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The General Assembly alone created the message, and it wrote that
message into state law for the watching electorate to see .... I can think
of no clearer demonstration of political accountability than for citizens
opposed to this "Choose Life" license plate to turn out the current
government and replace it with a government that will amend or repeal
the statute and perhaps even replace it with a statute calling for pro-
choice specialty plates.
85
Based on his assessment of the four factors, Judge Shedd argued that the Choose
86Life specialty plate reflected pure government speech.
Despite these divergent views on how courts should apply the four-factor
test, it seems to be an established part of the Fourth Circuit's government-speech
jurisprudence. Moreover, other circuits have adopted the Fourth Circuit's four
factors as their own.87 But before the Fourth Circuit could again consider the
government-speech doctrine, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass 'n.88 The intervening Johanns decision prompted the
Sixth Circuit to reject the Fourth Circuit's four-factor test and to criticize it as
being in tension with the Supreme Court's ruling.89 The Fourth Circuit attempted
to reconcile these positions in its next government-speech case.
85. Id. at 587.
86. Id. It is notable that Judge Williams joined this opinion. To a casual motorist unfamiliar
with the various methods for creating specialty license plates in Virginia and South Carolina, the
Sons of Confederate Veterans vanity plate would appear to be no different in form than the Choose
Life plate. Yet Judge Williams found the Sons of Confederate Veterans plate to be purely private
speech in SCV I, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002), and the Choose Life plate to be purely
government speech in Rose II, 373 F.3d at 587 (Shedd, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc). This divergence in reasoning could be cured by Justice Souter's proposed "reasonable
observer" test for government speech, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142
(2009) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment), which has been adopted by the Seventh Circuit. See
Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[The Fourth Circuit's] multi-
factor test can be distilled (and simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry: Under all the
circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to be the government or a private
party?"). In both instances, a typical motorist would likely recognize that a specialty tag-
regardless of its message-would have been selected by the driver and therefore contained an
element of private speech. The potential for subjectivity, however, probably renders this test just as
problematic in application as the four-factor test.
87. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (adopting the
Fourth Circuit's four-factor test).
88. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
89. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006) (criticizing the SCVI
test as leading to 'indeterminate result[s]' and arguing that it is contrary to the Johanns reasoning
(quoting Rose I, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., writing separately))).
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2. Page v. Lexington County School District One: The Four-Factor
Test Set Aside
In its first post-Johanns decision that called for a government-speech
analysis, the Fourth Circuit examined in Page v. Lexington County School
District One9° whether a school district improperly discriminated against a
private citizen based on his viewpoint when it disseminated unsolicited, favored
third-party messages using public resources-such as the district's Web site,
district-wide emails, and newsletters provided to students-to which the plaintiff
was denied equal access.91 In articulating the controlling legal principles, the
court initially reiterated SCVI's four factors, but it explained that the Johanns
Court "distilled them" into only two inquiries: (1) whether the government
established the message, and (2) whether the government effectively controlled
"the content and dissemination of the message. 92 The SCV I factors were absent
from the remainder of the decision, and the court ostensibly focused instead on
the Johanns analysis.93 But the Page court's application of these new factors
resurrected arguments that the Fourth Circuit had previously rejected in the
government-speech context.
Although the Page court framed the government-speech discussion in terms
of control over the content of challenged speech, as directed by Johanns,94 its
actual analysis focused on whether the school district controlled the medium of
communication.9 5 Throughout the decision, the court insisted that the plaintiff
was not entitled to access public resources to express a viewpoint on pending
legislation that was contrary to that of the district's viewpoint-even though
other third parties were given access to those same resources to express a
viewpoint that was consistent with the district's viewpoint-because the district
maintained control of those "channels of communication." 96 As Judge Niemeyer
wrote for the panel:
Accordingly, we conclude that the School District established its
own message and effectively controlled the channels of communication
through which it disseminated that message, as required for application
of the government speech doctrine under Johanns, and therefore that it
90. 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
91. Id. at 277-78.
92. Id. at 281 (citing Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-62).
93. Id. at 281-82 (citing Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-62).
94. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-62.
95. See Page, 531 F.3d at 282-85.
96. See, e.g., id. at 282 (noting that the speech was the government's speech because it was
filtered through "channels of communications controlled by the School District"); id. at 285 ("[T]he
School District sufficiently controlled this channel of communication so that its speech remained
government speech.").
[VOL. 61: 549
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss3/7
2010] FOURTH CIRCUIT GOVERNMENT-SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE 567
did not create a limited public forum to which Page was entitled
97access.
This reasoning was consistent with his opinion dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc in SCV11.98 There, Judge Niemeyer argued that any speech
appearing on a license plate should be attributed to the government because the
State owns and controls the medium of communication." Though that analysis
was not accepted by a majority of the Fourth Circuit during its debates regarding
the Sons of Confederate Veterans' license plate, it carried a unanimous panel in
Page.
Page's focus on government control of the channel of communication, rather
than on the message's actual content as instructed by Johanns, could have far-
reaching implications, as forum analysis applies only to restrictions on private
speech taking place on government property. Presumably, all government
property is "effectively controlled" by the State. Therefore, under the Page
analysis, all speech that takes place in a public or nonpublic forum could
potentially be considered government speech. With the understanding that all
speech in a forum could be attributed to the government, it is not difficult to
imagine a public body surveying existing third-party messages in a forum and
washing favorable communications of all private speech characteristics simply
by saying "me, too." Once government speech is present, of course, the public
entity could then close the forum to all dissenting viewpoints without fear of
First Amendment scrutiny. 100 This would be viewpoint discrimination in its
purest form and would give life to the very legitimate concern that "[i]t is nearly
impossible to concoct examples of viewpoint discrimination on government
channels that cannot otherwise be repackaged ex post as 'government
speech."' 10 1 Later decisions, however, have signaled that Page's reasoning will
not control future government-speech cases within the Fourth Circuit.
97. Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
98. See SCV II, 305 F.3d 241, 247-51 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc).
99. See id. at 249-50 (arguing that all content found on a license plate should be attributed to
the government because the State has "complete control over license plates").
100. For these reasons, Judge Luttig openly rebutted Judge Niemeyer's SCVII opinion as
being incompatible with the basic notion of private speech occurring in a public forum. See id. at
245-46 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en bane) (dismissing Judge Niemeyer's
conclusion that a specialty license plate constitutes government speech "because, and simply
because, the government owns and controls the plate" because such reasoning could improperly
render all private speech that takes place on public property that of the government). Of course,
Judge Luttig was no longer on the bench when Page was decided.
101. Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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3. Turner v. City Council and WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal
Services, Inc. v. Musgrave: The Four-Factor Test Revived
Since Page, the Fourth Circuit has had two occasions to assess whether
government speech is present in a given situation. Both times, it has measured
the challenged speech against SCVI's four factors, rather than against Page's
version of the government-speech test.10 2 In fact, neither case even cited to the
Page decision.
The Fourth Circuit issued the first opinion, Turner v. City Council, °3 exactly
one month after it published Page. There, the court faced a challenge to a city
council's policy regarding prayers before council meetings. 104 In order to
determine whether these prayers amounted to the council's own speech, the court
called on SCVI's four-factor test alone. 105 Because the prayers were a part of the
council's official agenda, regulated by a council policy, tailored to focus on
government business, and given only by council members, the Turner court had
no trouble concluding that each of the factors weighed in favor of a government-
speech finding.
10 6
The Fourth Circuit's most recent government-speech ruling reiterated
Turner's preference for the SCVI test instead of Page's reasoning. In West
Virginia Ass 'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Services, Inc. v. Musgrave,107 the
court reviewed a series of statutes that restricted advertising for video lottery
machines.1°8 As a matter of West Virginia constitutional law, the State runs all
lotteries for revenue-raising purposes. 10 9 Included among the legislative
provisions for video lottery machines are those that allow a state agency to issue
nontransferable licenses for the machines, restrict the number of video lottery
machines that can be in any establishment to five, and prohibit any private
advertising of video lotteries. Instead of allowing private advertisements, West
Virginia permits "retailers to display only a 12 inch by 12 inch uniform sign,
102. See WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 299
(4th Cir. 2009); Turner v. City Council, 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008).
103. 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008).
104. Id. at 353-54. The Turner decision is particularly noteworthy in its refusal to follow
Page's example because retired Justice O'Connor, who sat on the panel by designation, authored
the opinion. Id. at 353. Justice O'Connor had been one of the five Justices in the Johanns majority,
see Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 551 (2005), and her failure to import Johanns
into the Fourth Circuit's government-speech jurisprudence could be viewed as a signal that, at least
in her view, Johanns should be limited to the compelled-subsidy context of that case.
105. See Turner, 534 F.3d at 354 (citing SCVI, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)) (reciting
the four-factor test and citing SCVI as the circuit's lead authority on government speech).
106. See id. at 354-55.
107. 553 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2009).
108. See id. at 294.
109. See id. at 294-95 (citing W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 36).
110. Id. at 295-97.
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distributed by the Lotter Commission, which states 'West Virginia Lottery
Products available here."'
An organization representing clubs, restaurants, and convenience stores that
held video lottery licenses challenged this advertising restriction, arguing that it
amounted to an unconstitutional abridgement of its members' commercial
speech rights.1 12 In order to assess whether those rights even existed in this
context, the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether speech associated with West
Virginia's video lottery program amounted to government speech."' The court
held that elements of both government speech and private speech were present
and, therefore, the regulation was subject to the scrutiny prescribed by the
Supreme Court for restraints on commercial speech.114 It reached this conclusion
by first evaluating whether the government was attempting to convey a particular
message through the advertising restrictions associated with the State's video
lottery program and whether the State would bear the ultimate responsibility for
the message.1 15 On both counts, the Musgrave court held that these factors
weighed in favor of a government-speech finding.116 An advertisement's literal
speaker, however, would be the retailer who displayed it, which suggested an
element of private speech.' 17 Accordingly, the speech at issue was a mixture of
government and private, and the court subjected the regulatory scheme to First
Amendment scrutiny.li1
4. Guiding Principles from the Fourth Circuit's Divergent Case Law
The failure of the Turner and Musgrave courts to rely on or even cite Page
indicates that Page's modified test for finding government speech may not be the
controlling analysis in the Fourth Circuit. However, this likely remains an open
question as the court continues to develop its government-speech jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, a handful of guiding principles emerge from this battery of case
law and opinions from the circuit's judges.
Principally, these decisions indicate that the government-speech doctrine
applies when the government has actively and formally sought to communicate a
111. Id. at 297.
112. Id.
113. Seeid. at 298.
114. See id. at 299-301.
115. Id. at 298-99.
116. See id. at 298 ("By requiring that the lottery only be advertised through uniform signs and
by prohibiting all other advertisements, the state is conveying a message supporting measured use
of the video lottery."); id. at 299 ("The fact that the state is conveying a message for which it is
politically accountable suggests that the speech at issue is government speech.").
117. See id. at 299 (explaining that "[t]he speech being restricted also has attributes of private
speech" while reminding that the "literal speaker" prong is one aspect of the circuit's four-factor test
(citing Rose I, 361 F.3d 786, 792-93 (4th Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., writing separately); SCV I, 288
F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002))).
118. See id. at 301. The court had little problem concluding that the advertising restrictions
passed constitutional muster. See id. at 302-07.
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particular message. In all of the cases in which there was at least some indicia of
government speech, the government had passed a statutory scheme, 119 a written
policy, 12° or a resolution 121 that explained the government's position on the
relevant subject. By contrast, in SCV I, there was no indication that the Virginia
legislature had any interest in promoting the inclusion of the Confederate flag on
license plates; in fact, the opposite was true.
1 22
On a related point, the Fourth Circuit often focuses on whether the
government will ultimately be politically accountable for the speech. 123 As
discussed above in Part III.A, the circuit has held that hybrid speech is subject to
forum analysis and its accompanying requirement of viewpoint neutrality
because, as Judge Michael described, a decision to the contrary would
improperly allow the government to engage in "cloaked advocacy" and avoid
any consequences for its messages. 124 Similarly, the Page court devoted an entire
section of its discussion explaining the political costs that school board members
could face if the public disagreed with the district's position on the legislative
issue underlying the speech.
1 25
Not surprisingly, these two points are in lockstep with the government-
speech doctrine's core principles. Synthesizing them into a test that can be
universally applied to the satisfaction of the circuit's judges has proven elusive
thus far, however, and may require additional guidance from the Supreme Court.
The Court's most recent government-speech case, Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 126 failed to offer meaningful input into this question, though it did
provide significant insight into the related issue of when the government is able
to convert private speech into its own speech.127 That issue is examined next.
119. See Musgrave, 553 F.3d at 294; Rose I, 361 F.3d at 787; Griffin v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 274 F.3d 818, 819-20 (4th Cir. 2001).
120. See Turner v. City Council, 534 F.3d 352, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2008).
121. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 2008).
122. See SCVI, 288 F.3d at 613-14.
123. See, e.g., Musgrave, 553 F.3d at 299 ("The state is politically accountable for this
message because it conducts the video lottery program. The fact that the state is conveying a
message for which it is politically accountable suggests that the speech at issue is government
speech."); Rose I, 361 F.3d at 795 ("[T]he State's advocacy of the pro-life viewpoint may not be
readily apparent to those who see the Choose Life plate, and this insulates the State's advocacy
from electoral accountability.").
124. Rose I, 361 F.3d at 795-96.
125. See Page, 531 F.3d at 287-88 (explaining that the ballot box is "available to check the
government speech").
126. 128 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
127. See id. 1133 ("Just as government-commissioned and government-financed monuments
speak for the government, so do privately financed and donated monuments that the government
accepts and displays to the public on government land.").
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C. Is the Government-Speech Doctrine Applicable When a Public Body
Involves Third Parties in the Creation or Dissemination of a Message?
A final issue that frequently arises in the government-speech context
concerns the involvement of third parties in the creation or dissemination of a
message that the government claims to be its own. A natural tension arises when
a public body uses private messages or messengers to communicate a position
that the government claims as its own. On the one hand, the Fourth Circuit has
been clear that a public entity does not forfeit the government-speech doctrine
when it promotes a position through its "agents., 128 On the other hand, the court
has also recognized that viewpoint-based distinctions "are ordinarily not
permissible where the government exercises editorial discretion to choose from
among private messages those it will favor or subsidize. '129 To be sure, the
Supreme Court has unambiguously held that "[w]hen speakers and subjects are
similarly situated, the State may not pick and choose. But the government-
speech doctrine seems to allow exactly this type of discriminatory conduct when
the government is promoting a particular message and a private citizen agrees
with the government's position.
In examining this issue, early opinions from the Fourth Circuit measured the
level of government control over the speech before its initial publication as a
primary indicator of whether third-party speech could be considered speech of
the government. In SCV I, for instance, the Virginia General Assembly argued
that content on a specialty license plate was exclusively the government's own in
part because it was spelled out in a statute. 132 The Fourth Circuit rejected this
argument because Sons of Confederate Veterans initially designed the message
and then provided it to the State for its consideration. 133 Additionally, even
though this private speech was subject to agency review and approval, the SCVI
court found that the State rarely modified a proposed specialty plate message.134
The opposite was true in Rose I-the license plate's message was initially
created by the General Assembly and spelled out in a statute, not in any privately
created document.
135
This reasoning was reinforced in the Supreme Court's Johanns ruling. In
that case, the Court examined whether the "Beef: It's What's For Dinner"
advertising campaign constituted government speech even though private entities
128. SCVI, 288 F.3d 610, 617 (4th Cir. 2002).
129. Id. at 618 n.6.
130. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
131. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 282 (noting that the school
district circulated communications of third parties that supported its message).
132. See SCVI, 288 F.3d at 615-16.
133. See id. at 621 (explaining the wide discretion that Virginia's department of motor
vehicles' guidelines provided to private sponsors for the design of their respective specialty plates).
134. See id. (noting that "the record reveals that little, if any, control ordinarily is exercised'
over the content of specialty plates).
135. Rose I, 361 F.3d 786, 788-89 (4th Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., writing separately).
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participated in the message's creation.136 There, the drafting process was done by
a committee that was partially populated by appointees of the Secretary of
Department of Agriculture, and all messages were subject to final approval by
the Secretary himself before publication. 137Importantly, the Court noted that the
government's involvement went beyond appointing members to the design
committee and reviewing the finished work product.138 Instead of remaining
passive during the creation of the challenged messages, "[o]fficials of the
Department also attend and participate in the open meetings at which proposals
are developed., 139 In light of this collaborative effort between the government
and private speakers, over which the government retained the final approval
authority, the Johanns Court concluded that the marketing campaign was
government speech.
140
Although the Supreme Court's treatment of third-party participation in
creating government speech in Johanns was consistent with the Fourth Circuit's
previous analyses, the circuit has not rigorously adhered to this standard of
prepublication input and oversight by the government. In Page, the school
district disseminated through public resources various materials that were
consistent with the district's viewpoint on pending school-choice legislation but
that were independently prepared by private parties. 14 Additionally, the district
linked its Web site directly to the Web sites of third parties who agreed with the
district's position on the legislation, which in effect allowed those private groups
to broadcast whatever messages they chose through the government's
resources. 142 Despite the absence of any prepublication input by the district as to
these articles, talking-points pamphlets, PowerPoint presentations, and Web site
postings, the Page court held that the third-party Web sites amounted to
government speech because district personnel reviewed and approved them
136. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553-54 (2005).
137. See id. at 560 (noting that half of the design committee's members are designees of the
Secretary of Agriculture); id. at 561 ("[T]he Secretary exercises final approval authority over every
word used in every promotional campaign.").
138. See id. at 560-61 ("The message set out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end
the message established by the Federal Government.").
139. Id. at 561.
140. See id. at 562 ("When, as here, the government sets the overall message to be
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in
developing specific messages.").
141. Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 278-79 (4th Cir. 2008).
142. See id. at 278. A sample of the district's Web site as it existed at the time that the Page
litigation was commenced can be found through the Internet Archives database. See Lexington
County School District One, Voucher Legislation, http://web.archive.org/web/20051125224427/
www.lexingtonl.net/?page=NEWS/issues/PPIC/PPIC.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (displaying a
screenshot of the school district's Web site as it existed on November 25, 2005). Notably, the
district housed materials regarding the legislation on its Web site under a section entitled
"Controversial Issues."
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before they were redistributed through channels that the district ultimately
controlled.
The Supreme Court seems to have approved in part the Page analysis by its
recent decision in Pleasant Grove City. There, the Court held that a Ten
Commandments monument that a private organization created and donated to a
city for permanent display in a city park constituted government speech.144 The
Court based its decision on several factors, including the fact that permanent
displays in parks are usually selected by the government in its sole discretion,
that such monuments are judged on whether they communicate a message that
the public entity itself wishes to convey, and that the citizenry typically
associates a permanent monument in a public park with the government instead
of a private speaker. 145 Additionally, the Court noted that the City took
ownership of the monument, thus cutting off the private party's ability to alter
the monument's text.
146
This reasoning appears to be congruent with Page's outcome with respect to
the static materials that were at issue in that case, such as articles written by
private parties. 147 An article that the government reprints cannot later be changed
by the original author; therefore, the school district was able to review and adopt
every word of the text as its own before circulating the message through148
government resources. But Pleasant Grove City and Page diverge with respect
to transitory third-party speech, such as a Web site link on a government site to
the home page of a private entity.
The Page court explained that such a link was government speech because
the school district intended for the link to support its own message. 14 But the
text on the private party's Web site was beyond the school district's control and
could change without the district's knowledge, including to a message that the
district had no interest in promoting. 150 Such a link, therefore, is no different than
a public entity inviting a favored private speaker onto public property and giving
him an open microphone without the government having any prior knowledge or
ability to preapprove his speech. The Pleasant Grove City Court repeatedly
noted that the permanency of the Ten Commandments monument influenced its
143. Page, 531 F.3d at 282, 288 (concluding that by disseminating these materials, the district
"adopted and approved all speech, even that of third parties, as representative of its own position").
144. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132-34 (2009).
145. See id. at 1134 ("Government decisionmakers select the monuments that portray what
they view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into account such content-based factors as
esthetics, history, and local culture. The monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant to
convey and have the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute
government speech."); see also id. at 1133 ("In this context, there is little chance that observers will
fail to appreciate the identity of [the government as] the speaker.").
146. See id. at 1134 ("All rights previously possessed by the monument's donor have been
relinquished.").
147. See Page, 531 F.3d at 282.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 284.
150. See id. at 284-85.
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decision: the message contained on it could not be altered, the City was able to
review and accept the monument in its final form, and a normal observer would
understand that the City itself was speaking.1 51 The potential for messages
displayed on a private party's Web site to change at a moment's notice and
without warning, therefore, would appear to force links on government Web
sites to dynamic third-party sites beyond the reach of the government-speech
label under the Pleasant Grove City analysis.
152
The Fourth Circuit will no doubt revisit this issue in future cases and refine
the analysis further. But much like the question of when the government itself is
speaking, it will likely take a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court to resolve
the Fourth Circuit's disparate treatment of third-party assistance in the context of
government speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
To date, the government-speech doctrine has created more questions than
answers. The Fourth Circuit, like the Supreme Court, has struggled at times to
identify how this defense to a claim of viewpoint discrimination melds with
established First Amendment norms. The government must be allowed to speak,
of course, but thus far, the Fourth Circuit has not recognized any boundaries on
the government's ability to speak beyond those boundaries imposed by the
Establishment Clause. Considerable disagreement among the circuit's judges
suggests that it may be difficult to build consensus on the court with respect to
any limitations on the doctrine that are not prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Additionally, while the circuit's decisions indicate that the court is aware that a
public entity may try to use the doctrine to avoid political scrutiny for a
controversial message, it has not reached a clear answer as to how to resolve this
problem. At bottom, the Fourth Circuit has provided much guidance for public
entities wishing to exercise their ability to speak and has consistently been on the
frontier of this area of the law. But because the doctrine's finer points have been
151. See Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 ("Permanent monuments displayed on public
property typically represent government speech."); id. at 1133 (noting that there is usually no
confusion as to who is speaking when a display is permanent); id. at 1134 (reminding that "the City
took ownership of [the] monument and put it on permanent display"); id. at 1138 (observing that
forum analysis does not apply where permanent monuments are installed on public property and
distinguishing prior cases that involved temporary speech, such as displays in parades).
152. This is particularly so when, as in Page, the government takes steps to distance itself
from responsibility for the content of third-party Web sites that it broadcasts through public
channels. See Page, 531 F.3d at 284 (reproducing a disclaimer on the school district's Web site
stating that the district "does not endorse, approve, certify or control these external Web
addresses"). To be sure, when the government specifically states that it is not the speaker, it is
difficult to see how it can be held politically accountable for the speech. It is not surprising, then,
that in a similar situation, the Sixth Circuit held that the inclusion of links to dynamic third-party
Web sites on a government's Web site created a nonpublic forum. See Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of
Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 844 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he city's Web site, which established links to
other Web sites, is a nonpublic forum under the First Amendment.").
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the subjects of multiple competing opinions from the Fourth Circuit's judges, a
comprehensive set of guidelines for the government-speech doctrine may be
required from the Supreme Court before these issues can be fully resolved for
governments and private speakers within the circuit.
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